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In 1917, the Bolsheviks promised the liberation of the working masses from ex-
ploitation. And yet, within twenty years, they had delivered a regime that was 
substantially more exploitative and repressive than that of the Tsarist regime they 
had overthrown. This article argues that more than a quarter of a century af-
ter the opening of the archives, we still misapprehend how it happened. Histo-
rians tend to see the process as programmatic, or planned and intentional: that 
the Bolsheviks were authoritarian by nature, or that Stalin hijacked the Revolu-
tion and satisfied his lust for power by building a personal dictatorship. The ar-
ticle argues that we have failed to grasp the extent to which the positive pro-
gramme of liberation continued to motivate the Bolshevik leadership throughout 
the interwar period. But they had underestimated the obstacles to creating a con-
sensual, participatory political order. Considerable progress was made overcom-
ing basic illiteracy, but it was another matter altogether to establish a functioning 
administrative apparatus, to fight and win the civil war, and to rebuild a shattered 
economy. The breakdown of liberal (“bourgeois”) democracies in Europe encour-
aged complacency about the superiority of the “transitional” proletarian dictator-
ship. The struggle for power after Lenin’s death turned local organisations against 
inner party democracy. It did not seem appropriate to revive it either in the midst 
of collectivisation and rapid industrialisation. The survival of the Revolution 
and catching up to the advanced capitalist countries took precedence. But if we 
treat extreme political violence and dictatorship as ends in themselves, we will 
fail adequately to grasp the fate of the Revolution.
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В 1917  г. большевики обещали освобождение трудящихся масс от экс-
плуатации. Но в течение 20 лет они установили режим гораздо более экс-
плуататорский и репрессивный по своей сути, чем побежденный ими ца-
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ризм. Автор утверждает, что спустя более четверти века после открытия 
архивов мы все еще остаемся в неведении по поводу того, почему так слу-
чилось. Историки склонны рассматривать этот исход как запрограмми-
рованный либо преднамеренно спланированный, поскольку больше-
вики были авторитарны по своей природе, или же Сталин «оседлал» 
революцию и установил личную диктатуру, удовлетворяя жажду власти. 
До сих пор нет ясности в понимании того, в какой степени положитель-
ная программа освобождения народа продолжала мотивировать больше-
вистское руководство в межвоенный период. Большевики недооценили 
препятствия на пути создания общественного порядка, основанного 
на согласованном политическом участии. Существенный прогресс был 
достигнут на пути ликвидации неграмотности, но значительно труднее 
было создать функционирующий государственный аппарат, бороть-
ся и выиграть Гражданскую войну, а также восстановить разрушенную 
экономику. Падение либеральных («буржуазных») демократий в Европе 
укрепляло ощущение превосходства «переходной» пролетарской дикта-
туры. Борьба за власть после смерти Ленина направила местные партий-
ные организации на борьбу с внутрипартийной демократией. Возрож-
дать ее в условиях коллективизации и ускоренной индустриализации 
казалось неуместным. Гораздо более важным представлялось выживание 
революции и стремление догнать передовые капиталистические страны. 
Автор отмечает, что если относиться к проявлениям политического на-
силия и диктатуре как к конечной цели советской власти, невозможно 
должным образом понять судьбу революции. 
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As we approach the hundredth anniversary of the October Revolution, 
it is an appropriate moment to return to what was perhaps the key ques-
tion at the heart of Anglo-American “Soviet Studies” between the 1950s 
and the 1980s. How is it that a revolution that promised the liberation 
of working people ended up generating an extremely violent and hy-
per-centralised dictatorship? The question drew the attention of perhaps 
every major specialist in the period, a time when the secretive Soviet state 
was blocking access to the overwhelming mass of party and state archives 
[Deutscher; Schapiro 1955; Daniels; Laue; Pethybridge; Carr; Service; 
Schapiro, 1984; Gill]. Curiously, though we have now had access to almost 
all of these materials since 1991, when the Soviet system collapsed, very 
little work has been done on the evolution of the Bolshevik political order 
largely because political history is not in fashion. Of course a single article 
cannot definitively explain the origins of the communist dictatorship. It is 
a huge question that needs to be addressed in many dimensions (ideology, 
culture, politics and so on) and this text represents a first effort to sketch 
the outlines of a long-term project I started a few years ago. I have been col-
lecting documents from central archives in Moscow (РГАСПИ – RGASPI), 
from republic archives (in Ukraine) and more local materials (oblast’ / 
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guberniia / uezd / raion) materials in Vinnitsa, Ukraine and Ekaterinburg 
in the Urals. The aim of this article is briefly to discuss the broadest out-
lines of the Anglo-American scholarship on the issue, and to indicate a few 
ways I propose to challenge some basic ways the issues are understood on 
the basis of the materials I have collected.
The first thing to grasp about early Anglo-American scholarship on 1917 
and its aftermath is that it was a product of the Cold War, when the USSR 
was the enemy. The “totalitarian model” developed (among others) by Carl 
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski [Friedrich, Brzezinski] posited that 
“democracy” represented by the US was a perfect counterpoint to “total-
itarianism” represented by the USSR. The US represented “government 
by the will of the people” and the USSR represented “government against 
the will of the people”. Friedrich and Brzezinski asserted that the US en-
couraged citizens to think for themselves, whereas Soviet citizens were 
told what to think. This view of the world divided between “good guys” 
and “bad guys” was grossly simplistic, but it nevertheless had a profound 
resonance in Anglo-American thinking for a generation. In this context, it 
is not surprising that the dominant view was that Bolshevism was inher-
ently authoritarian; that the 1917 Revolution was a coup d’etat and the new 
regime always lacked popular legitimacy; and that Leninism led inevitably 
to Stalinism [Schapiro, 1955; Laue; Pipes; Malia].
Since the late 1960s, there have been various challenges to basic tenets 
of the totalitarian “revisionists” like Robert Tucker and Stephen Cohen 
argued that Leninism and Stalinism were different political phenomena, 
and that one did not lead inevitably to the other. Cohen argued most force-
fully that Stalinism was a perversion of Leninism [Tucker, 1973; Cohen]. 
In the 1980s a second wave of revisionists from among social historians 
variously attributed the model. Early origins of dictatorship to Russian 
backwardness [Lewin] and the impact of the Civil War [Fitzpatrick]. 
Studies of 1917 challenged the notion of a coup d’etat, and identified ele-
ments of popular support [Rabinowitch; Smith, 1983]. And yet, in the An-
glo-American vision of the roots of the communist dictatorship, the figure 
of Joseph Stalin still looms large. It remains the dominant view both among 
“traditionalists” and most “revisionists” that Stalin’s personal ambitions; 
his lust for power; his control of the party machinery; his revengefulness 
and fear of enemies; his predisposition to concentrate power in the politi-
cal centre together played the central role in the emergence of the dictator-
ship. Stalin was the principal author of the Soviet variant of totalitarianism 
[Deutscher; Conquest; Tucker, 1990; Khlevniuk; Kotkin].
This paper will concentrate mostly on the aftermath of 1917, but 
the larger project will start at the turn of the twentieth century, not only 
to trace the origins of the Bolshevik party, but also to explore the domes-
tic and international context both of the Revolution and of the descent 
into dictatorship. My first point is that the situation was fluid and no out-
comes were inevitable. There were plenty of reasons to be guardedly opti-
mistic about the prospects for democratic change in Russia. The broader 
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trend across the developed world had been towards democracy, towards 
the extension of a democratic suffrage. Russia was a relative latecom-
er in the process, hampered of course by an autocratic regime resistant 
to change, by low levels of popular education, the small middle class and so 
on, but the direction of change was promising. The Bolsheviks were not 
anti-democratic in principle. The conspiratorial party – seen by historians 
so often as the ‘genetic’ origin of the party dictatorship – was not an end 
in itself, but a necessary means to achieve a state that would rule in the in-
terests of working people. And the history of the revolutionary movement 
in Russia was a history of political debate – principled and often angry 
debate – shifting coalitions and occasional compromise. That is an essential 
ingredient of democracy.
My second and much more significant point is that historians tend 
to exaggerate the clarity of the choice between “democracy” and “dicta-
torship” (or totalitarianism, or authoritarianism) in early twentieth-cen-
tury Europe. We tend to forget that it was far from clear to contemporary 
observers what “democracy” was, and even if it was a good thing. We tend 
to forget, for example, that in 1917, at the time of the Revolution, only 
a minority of the adult population of Great Britain had the vote [Sternhell; 
LeBon; Spengler].1 To get the vote, one needed to own property – a qual-
ification specifically intended to exclude the working class. While there 
was a general acceptance that things had to be done to improve the liv-
ing and working conditions of the labouring classes, a substantial part 
of the European elite – and middle class – were staunchly opposed to giv-
ing workers the vote. They did not think that working people were capable 
of understanding complex issues of policy and thus to vote in an informed 
way. In that sense, the views of the Bolshevik leadership were rather simi-
lar to those of many European conservatives. Bolsheviks tended to accept 
that the working classes of the Russian Empire were backward and that 
the process of educating them and drawing them into government would 
take generations. In reference then to the Cold War-era literature on early 
Soviet politics, historians tended to filter the story of early Bolshevik Russia 
through the lens of the contemporary scene where the world was divided 
between democratic “good guys” (Europe and America) and the authori-
tarian “bad guys” of the USSR. Presenting the evolution of the early Soviet 
state as a story of authoritarian figures defeating the democrats entirely 
overlooked the parlous state of democracy in Europe at the time of the Oc-
tober Revolution. Why should the Bolsheviks embrace some form of “lib-
eral” democracy when so many Europeans considered it to be dangerous, 
ineffective and rotten? And yet they did not reject democracy as such.
The Bolsheviks took power in the name of working people. There is 
no reason to question their commitment to end the exploitation of la-
1 In Britain, a series of reform acts between the 1830s and 1920s gradually abolished 
property and gender qualifications on the vote. Some European countries were ahead of 
Britain in enacting universal suffrage, but most were slower primarily because they thought 
that universal suffrage would lead to revolution, if not the end of western civilisation. 
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bour by capital. That was 
no simple task, though 
it was far simpler than 
establishing a new polit-
ical order from scratch, 
to come up with an 
alternative to liberal, 
representative democ-
racy. They had almost 
no time to grapple with 
such questions before 
the Civil War began 
in earnest. As students 
of past revolutions, they 
knew well that existing 
elites would do every-
thing in their power 
to crush Bolshevik pow-
er. It would be necessary 
to respond to violence 
not just with violence, 
but also with unity 
and discipline. The fate 
of the February Revolu-
tion presented other les-
sons for the Bolsheviks. The insistence of the Provisional Government 
on procedural norms, the rule of law, consultation and discussion inhib-
ited them from getting things done, and that contributed to the descent 
into chaos. Bolsheviks knew that if their revolution were to succeed 
in creating a participatory proletarian state, they would need a high-
ly centralised, disciplined, fearless and ruthless organisation, at least 
in the first instance.
In this context, Bolshevik political practice in the context of the civil 
war and after was not lacking a democratic, liberationist impulse. Here I 
do not mean to brush the more authoritarian, dictatorial actions under 
the carpet so to speak – the creation of the Cheka and the Red Terror; 
disbanding the Constituent Assembly; the suppression of the Kronstadt 
rebellion; the factionalism rule, though most of these can be seen as fun-
damentally defensive moves rather than as expressions of the sort of state 
the Bolsheviks wanted to create. “Soviet” government – government 
rooted in Soviet structures, from local soviets up to the Central Execu-
tive Committee – showed an impulse to create a responsive, consultative, 
participatory political order. The problem was that it did not work. It was, 
perhaps, too consultative and participatory in the circumstances. Discus-
sion of crucial issues took too long when decisive leadership was needed 
[Cook; McAuley; Rigby; Collins; Pietsch].
Joseph Stalin. 1918. At the front of the Civil War
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Again, historians are too quick to forget that in the context of the First 
World War, the “democratic” states of Europe suspended the work of parlia-
mentary opposition and invoked what were called governments of national 
unity. These “democratic” regimes created political police forces to silence 
opposition to the war. They engaged in widespread surveillance and mass 
propaganda to sustain morale and shape popular opinion [Justifying War…; 
Holquist; Englander]. When the war ended, the democratic regimes radi-
cally restrained political policing and surveillance. They restored the role 
of the formal opposition. They lifted controls on the press and disband-
ed the apparatuses of propaganda. And they extended the franchise. But 
for the Bolsheviks, there was not the same sort of clear transition from war 
to peace. In places, the civil war dragged on until 1923. The war with Po-
land (1919–1921) was perceived as an extension of the civil war by proxy. 
European states made no secret of their anti-Communism, such that 
the Bolsheviks had the sense that a new intervention could occur at any 
time [Harris, 2007].
The Bolsheviks did not abandon the Soviet structures. Rather, they 
gradually grafted on party structures via party “fractions” that could 
pre-decide issues by means of party discipline. The rise of the Party as 
the new locus of decision-making was not part of some grand plan, nor was 
there a conscious drift away “democracy” towards “dictatorship”. There was 
no contradiction in Bolshevik minds between “democracy” and the “dic-
tatorship” of the proletariat. The European “democracies” tended to of-
fer the electorate a choice between parties of traditional elites and par-
ties of “labour”, but the labour parties tended to be reformist, accepting 
the existence of capitalism, the practical dominance of the “bourgeoisie”, 
and the continued exploitation of labour by capital. “Bourgeois democ-
racy” ruled in the interests of the bourgeoisie, whereas the “dictatorship” 
of the proletariat was more democratic (at least in theory) because it ruled 
in the interests of the broader mass of working people. The “Lenin Levy” 
and campaigns for “Soviet construction” were substantially about bringing 
representatives of the labouring masses into administration with the lon-
ger term aim of overcoming their political backwardness and encouraging 
a popular engagement in the revolutionary project. To the extent to which 
the Bolsheviks had a coherent vision of democracy, it was a vision of direct 
democracy, in which, to use Lenin’s phrase, “every scullery maid must learn 
to govern the state” [Ленин, с. 306–307].
So what happened to this “democratic” spirit across the 1920s? The his-
toriography overwhelmingly points the finger of blame at Joseph Stalin. 
The standard explanation, which dominates to the present day, is that 
he sought to accumulate total power, and that he used his position as Gen-
eral Secretary of the Party and its power over appointments to build a per-
sonal following [Kotkin; Trotsky, 1940]. The standard explanation tells 
us that Stalin was able to demonise his opponents, end any meaningful 
“intra-party democracy” and thus establish a monolithic orthodoxy that 
he alone defined. But there are big problems with the standard explanation. 
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The first problem with 
the standard explanation 
is that the General Secre-
tary’s power over appoint-
ments did not put him 
in a position to pack party 
and state bodies with peo-
ple who would be person-
ally loyal to him. Here we 
need to remember that 
the Bolshevik party was 
completely transformed 
in the first decade after 
the revolution. At the time 
of the February Revolu-
tion, the Bolsheviks were 
a 20,000 strong band 
of generally well-educated 
professional revolution-
aries. But by the middle 
of the 1920s, party mem-
bership exceeded 500,000. 
It was then a mass-based 
party of power, with 
much lower levels of edu-
cation on average. Stalin’s 
primary responsibility 
when he took over as General Secretary in 1922 was to establish a basic ad-
ministration of party records, to distribute cadres to a network of regional 
organisations that was expanding at a blistering pace and to develop basic 
administrative skills and a smoothly functioning apparatus of government. 
The records of the Party Secretariat show that this organisation was barely 
able to cope with the task, and that they were, for the most part, assigning 
cadres “completely blindly” [РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 69. Д. 140. Л. 30]. There is 
very little archival evidence that Stalin used the Secretariat to appoint people 
on the basis of their loyalty to him [Harris, 2005]. We have to look for expla-
nations of the descent into dictatorship elsewhere.
To understand the closing down of party debate and the imposition 
of a single orthodoxy, we have to look beyond the personality and ambitions 
of one man, Joseph Stalin. It is most instructive to look again at the trans-
formation of the Bolshevik party, at its massive growth and the staffing 
of a vast array of state and party bodies. The Bolsheviks did not have a clear 
idea of how to build an apparatus of state when they seized power. For years 
after the Revolution, the local government was in chaos and often unable 
to deliver the most basic administrative functions. Particularly after Sverd-
lov’s death in 1919, Lenin relied on Stalin more than anyone else to bring 
Joseph Stalin. 1924. Speech  
at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets
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order out of the chaos. As Sverdlov had done, Stalin focused on setting out 
clear divisions of responsibility and clear hierarchies of responsibility. He 
earned a reputation as a “centraliser”, though there is little reason to con-
clude he was building central power for its own sake or to build a dicta-
torship. His analysis of the challenges of local administration had Lenin’s 
support, and though Lenin criticised him on occasion for heavy-handed 
tactics, there was no division between the two on the centralising strategy 
[Smith, 1998; Suny, p. 210–212].2
Of course there were groups and individuals who objected to the tenden-
cy to centralism and pressed for various forms of democratic change as soon 
as the tide of the Civil War shifted in the Bolsheviks’ favour. Nikolai Osinskii, 
Timofei Sapronov and others coalesced in a loose organisation known as 
the Group of Democratic Centralism, arguing that War Communism had fed 
an excessive and “bureaucratic” concentration of power in the centre. They 
favoured a radical decentralisation of power and the “popular participation 
of the workers in government and economic administration as the most vital 
precondition of socialist construction” [Kowalski, p. 3; Daniels, ch. 4; Rem-
ington, p. 115–116]. The Workers’ Opposition, led by Alexander Shliapnikov, 
picked up their mantle in the early 1920s, again railing against centralisation 
and proposing that workers should elect councils that would direct the econ-
omy. Both groups had their supporters in the Party, but neither had enough 
support to shift the prevailing sentiment in favour of centralism and the en-
forcement of a single political line imposed from above. The argument against 
rushing democratic reform was reasonably clear and sensible. The Civil War 
was more or less over, but the industrial economy was a shambles, running 
at around fifteen percent of its pre-war capacity and desperately in need of in-
vestment. The countryside was in the grips of famine through 1922. The war 
with Poland (1919–1921) and various plots uncovered by the political police 
signalled to many Bolsheviks that the threat of counter-revolution remained 
very real. Giving control over a decimated economy to decentralised councils 
elected by illiterate and semi-literate workers was fraught with risks. There 
was nothing particularly “unbolshevik” in the proposals. They were just in-
appropriate to the current circumstances. 
But when would the time be right for democratic reforms? By 1923, 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) was driving a clear recovery in the indus-
trial economy. The famine had been brought to a close. The threat of count-
er-revolution had not especially receded, but there were high hopes for com-
munist revolution in Europe. Trotsky made that case, as lead signatory 
of the Declaration of the 46 (October 1923) and author of a New Course 
for the Party (December 1923). Trotsky had not supported the Democratic 
Centralists or the Worker’s Opposition. Indeed he had contributed to their 
defeat, though his 1923 proposals echoed certain elements of the platforms 
of these earlier groups [Priestland, ch. 1]. Trotsky argued that the current 
system of centralised command was choking off discussion in the Party. 
2 Most famously Lenin criticised Stalin for his conduct in the so-called “Georgian Affair”. 
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The emerging gulf between the secretaries who issued the commands 
(verkhi) and the rank and file who had to implement them (nizy) was not 
only causing discontent in the lower orders of the Party. More significantly, 
it was preventing the correction of mistakes made by the centre in the elab-
oration of NEP. Among other things, Trotsky demanded the election of all 
party committees by their members [Trotsky, 1943].3
Did Trotsky foresee and try to stop the emergence of a communist 
dictatorship? That is what Trotsky wanted people to think: over the years 
many historians have substantially accepted his accounts, but the archives 
indicate that they were more than a little self-serving. He was ill through 
much of 1923 with the consequences of malaria, attending the meetings 
of the Politburo infrequently. At the time, top party leaders were working 
long hours to address the problems of the emergent quasi-capitalist system 
of NEP: the Scissors Crisis, the structure of foreign trade, the role of trades 
unions and so on. Trotsky was given responsibility for perhaps the most im-
portant question: the organisation of industry. His work, largely completed 
at home and apart from the rest of the Politburo, increasingly turned him 
against NEP and its emphasis on the trade between town and countryside. 
When he presented his proposals to the Politburo, they were clearly incom-
patible with the direction his colleagues were taking, and they demanded 
changes [РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 3. Д. 337; Д. 339. Л. 4, 342]. It was a fascinat-
ing moment because the transition to NEP had been difficult and fraught 
with crisis and controversy. For the first time, in the summer of 1923, there 
were signs that NEP might generate economic growth that could com-
pensate for the compromise with “capitalist elements” [РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. 
Оп. 84. Д. 470; Ф. 17. Оп. 171. Д. 26. Л. 56–62] but just at that moment, 
Trotsky was rallying the doubters. 
The Politburo majority was horrified that their influential but largely 
absentee colleague was trying to undermine the immense work that they 
had undertaken in the previous nine months. In order to iron out some 
kind of workable compromise, they held a series of meetings with Trotsky, 
often at his flat in light of his continuing illness [РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 84. 
Д. 476. Л. 4]. In early December, they thought they had settled on a mu-
tually agreeable formulation, but within days, Trotsky began to publish 
the New Course articles in Pravda [РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 3. Д. 400. Л. 1]. 
Stalin and the rest of the majority were furious. Trotsky seemed to be sig-
nalling his intention publicly to disagree with the policy platform he had 
only just agreed to. In short, in advocating freedom of policy discussion, 
elections to party bureaus and closing the gulf between the verkhi (bosses) 
and nizy (rank and file), he was not promoting democratic principles so 
much as identifying a way to rally the rank and file against the leadership. 
Stalin and the other members of the majority made it clear that they were 
not opposed to the electoral principle in party committees, but in the cur-
rent conditions it was not going to be possible in all committees, every time 
3 It was originally printed as a series of articles in Pravda in December 1923.
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[Сталин, с. 368–369; РГАСПИ. Ф. 558. Оп. 1. Д. 2569. Л. 71 (Сталин); 
Ф. 17. Оп. 84. Д. 476. Л. 9–10 (Бухарин); Ф. 17. Оп. 171. Д. 26. Л. 63–72 
(Дзержинский)]. In that regard, Stalin and the majority had ample sup-
port among party secretaries in district and provincial party organisations 
throughout the Soviet Union
Local organisations were prone to dysfunction, and Trotsky’s demands 
were doomed to make matters worse. In the early 1920s, Stalin’s Secretar-
iat had standardised a clarified the responsibilities of local organisations, 
but infighting (skloki) remained a serious problem. Relations between 
Soviets and their executive committees (ispolkomy) frequently broke 
down. Soviet executive committees’ relations with parallel party com-
mittee were often tense. District committees did not always get along 
with their bosses in the guberniia committees and so on. Most skloki 
were rooted in personality clashes, but they were exacerbated by linger-
ing confusion about who was responsible for what, and the grave chal-
lenges of local governance in the early 1920s. Establishing an effective 
local administration and rebuilding the local economy after years of war, 
amidst famine in the countryside and mass unemployment in the cit-
ies, was always going to be an immensely difficult task, made even more 
difficult by meagre budgets and shortages of cadres with basic admin-
istrative skills. The challenges bred resentments, provoked infighting 
and the conflicts tended to paralyse organisations bringing their work 
to a standstill [Getty, ch. 5; Davies, Harris, ch. 1].
In this context, Trotsky’s proposals were seen as a recipe for disaster 
[ДАВО. Ф. 1. Оп. 1. Д. 5. Л. 19; Д. 47. Л. 54; ЦДООСО. Ф. 4. Оп. 2. Д. 45. 
Л. 9; Ф. 8. Оп. 1. Д. 42. Л. 1–2]. Given the extremely low educational levels 
of the local party rank and file, giving them the power to elect party secre-
taries was likely to make a difficult situation even worse. Talented and ex-
perienced cadres were in extremely short supply such that it made sense 
that they should be assigned to organisations where the need was greatest. 
Where skloki paralysed organisations, moving the embattled cadres to an-
other organisation was the preferred strategy [ДАВО. Ф. 1. Оп. 1. Д. 43. 
Л. 12; Д. 44. Л. 6, 60; Д. 45. Л. 1, 6; ЦДООСО. Ф. 1494. Оп. 1. Д. 190. 
Л. 42–42 об]. Trotsky had demanded not only elections to all party com-
mittees, but also the end of naznachenstvo: the power of party cadre de-
partments to assign party officials with organisations under their purview. 
It might have worked in Moscow or Petrograd where there was a much high-
er concentration of educated and experienced officials, but in the provinces, 
Trotsky’s proposals looked like a serious threat to the basic administrative 
stability and early signs of economic growth that had only just emerged.
It is important to note that this does not mean that there was any prin-
cipled opposition to democratic reform either in the Politburo majority or 
in the provinces. There was only recognition that it was premature. Both 
in the centre and the provinces there were serious and sustained efforts 
to train and promote new cadres. The majority acceded to Trotsky’s call 
from the New Course of December 1923 to draw hundreds of thousands 
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of industrial workers into the Party. From the autumn of 1923, there was 
a campaign to monitor party bosses and to remove those who used their 
positions for personal gain. There were renewed efforts to encourage 
members of the public to attend party meetings and for party secretaries 
at all levels to make regular public speeches on the work of their organi-
sations. They were directed to form networks of “study circles” in which 
the members of the public could learn more about and discuss party pol-
icy. There is plenty of evidence of a serious effort to prevent the emer-
gence of a self-serving, authoritarian ruling caste, and to encourage mem-
bers of the public to take an interest in what their government was doing 
[КПСС в резолюциях…]. The actions of the Politburo majority were con-
sistent with Lenin’s injunction that “every scullery maid must learn to gov-
ern the state”. They were consistent too with a growing body of contempo-
rary opinion in Europe that giving the vote to the ill-educated, “immature” 
working masses was a threat to political stability. 
But when would the time be right to reverse the centralisation of power 
and allow the masses to exercise the skills the state was encouraging them 
to develop? There was never a shortage of reasons to put it off. Internal 
and external threats to the Revolution remained grave, at least in the eyes 
of the Soviet leadership. The demands of leadership and administration 
became ever more complex, especially with the beginning of the Five-Year 
plans in the late 1920s. The growing need for specialised skills and knowl-
edge made Lenin’s hopes for the scullery maid seem naïve. In the provinc-
es, the principal focus of party and state officials remained unchanged. Sta-
ble administration and economic growth took precedence over open policy 
discussion. Indeed the two were seen to be in conflict. Trotsky did not stop 
attacking the Politburo majority, and every subsequent episode in the dis-
pute brought complaints that the progress of their practical work was dis-
rupted. They enthusiastically responded to the majority’s calls for party 
unity and discipline, and raised few objections when, in 1927, Trotsky was 
ultimately expelled from the Party.
My intention here is not to absolve Stalin of responsibility 
for the descent into dictatorship, but rather to observe that the focus on 
the actions and intentions of one man results in a gross simplification 
of events. I have tried to argue here that the Anglo-American scholarship 
has tended to assert that there was a clear choice for the Bolsheviks 
between “democracy” and “dictatorship”, and that they opted 
for dictatorship. My first point was that democratic change in Europe 
at the turn of the twentieth century was fraught with controversy, 
and in a moment of crisis during the First World War democratic 
development was reversed in important respects. Soviet Russia was 
developmentally much farther behind Britain, France, Germany 
and other “democratic” states, and in a much more profound political 
crisis. In the first decade of Soviet power, Bolshevik leaders considered 
various institutional structures and pathways to embed a different 
vision of democracy, but they commonly accepted that it would take 
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generations to achieve. And because the end of the civil war did not end 
the sense of threat and crisis, they remained focused on the importance 
of discipline and unity. That combined with the transformation 
of the Party from a narrow group of professional revolutionaries 
to a mass party of power, and the subsequent weakness of commitment 
to open party discussion, particularly at the subnational level, gave 
Stalin the opportunity indefinitely to delay democratic development 
and to develop instead the mobilisational state that would carry out 
the “Great Break”. The strange coincidence in 1936 of the introduction 
of elections to party organisations on the one hand, with the beginning 
of the “great terror” is the subject of my on-going research.
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